principles that apply to all crimes are known as what
journal article
Law and Philosophy
Published Past: Springer
https://www. jstor .org/stable/27652617
Criminal law scholars approach legality in diverse ways. Some scholars eschew over-arching principles and proceed directly to one or more distinct "rules": (1) the rule against retroactive criminalization; (2) the dominion that criminal statutes exist construed narrowly; (iii) the rule confronting the judicial creation of common-police force offenses; and (4) the rule that vague criminal statutes are void. Other scholars seek a single principle, i.eastward., the "principal of legality," that they claim underlies the four rules. In dissimilarity, I believe that both approaches are misguided. There is no such thing as a unmarried "principle of legality;" yet, the iv same rules are not unrelated to each other. The so-called "principle of legality" consists of 2 singled-out norms that derive, respectively, from two fundamental principles of criminal justice, viz., the principle, "No person shall exist punished in the absence of a bad mind," and the principle that underlies the maxim, "Every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty." The first norm of legality explains the rules regarding ex post facto legislation, and rules regarding "notice" and "fair warning" of judicial decisions. When a person is punished for violating a rule that was non-existent or unclear at the time he acted, he is punished for conduct that the land now condemns and seeks to prevent past ways of penal sanctions. Accordingly, at the time the person is prosecuted, his merits is not that he did non practice annihilation that the state regards as incorrect, but, rather, that he neither knew nor should have known that he was doing something that the state would come to regard as incorrect. He ought, indeed, to be excused for his mistake, but only because of a principle that is common to excuses by and large: "No person ought to exist punished in the absence of a guilty mind." He should exist excused because fifty-fifty when a person does something the state condemns and seeks to forestall, he ought not to be blamed for it unless he was motivated in a sure way, namely, by an attitude of disrespect for the legitimate interests of the political community past whose norms he is bound. The Second norm of legality informs several of the remaining rules, though not all of them. The 2nd norm is that a person ought non to exist punished in the name of a political customs unless it can confidently be said that the community officially regards his conduct equally warranting the criminal punishment at issue. Information technology is a norm that is most commonly associated with the dominion of lenity, but it is not bars to the construction of statutes that are ambiguous or vague. It tin also be also violated when a person is punished for violating a statute that has fallen into desuetude, regardless of how widely promulgated or narrowly defined the statute may be. This second norm derives from a principle that also underlies the presumption of innocence — the just difference being that the presumption of innocence is a preference for acquittal in the event of doubtfulness regarding the facts which an role player is charged, while the second norm of legality is a preference for acquittal in the event of incertitude regarding the scope of the offense which he is charged. Still, one "rule " remains that this analysis throws into question — namely, the rule that "vague" criminal statutes are void. Criminal statutes are sometimes so broadly divers that they do, indeed, infringe constitutionally protected rights of speech, movement, etc. — in which consequence they ought to be invalidated on those very grounds. And criminal statutes are sometimes so broadly drafted that, before applying them, courts ought to construe them to apply only to constitutionally unprotected acts that courts tin can confidently say the relevant political customs regards as warranting punishment. But once statutes are so construed to utilize only to constitutionally unprotected acquit, courts take no further reason to invalidate them because, with respect to the narrowly divers conduct such statutes are construed to prohibit, "mutual social duty" alone ought to alert actors that their conduct is doubtable.
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Source: https://www.jstor.org/stable/27652617
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